As already mentioned in our Infiltrate '16 and RuhrSec '16 talks, Code White spent some research time to look for serialization gadgets. Apart from the Javassist/Weld gadget we also found an old but interesting gadget, only using classes from the Java Runtime Environment (so called JRE gadget).
We called the gadget Return of the Rhino since the relevant gadget classes are part of the Javascript engine Rhino, bundled with Oracle JRE6 and JRE7.
As you may already know, the Rhino Script engine has already been abused in JVM sandbox escapes in the past (e.g. CVE-2011-3544 of Michael Schierl and CVE-2012-3213 of James Forshaw).
We stumbled over the gadget just by accident as we realized that there is a huge difference between the official Oracle JRE and the JRE's bundled in common Linux distros.
Most may not know that the Rhino Script Engine is actively developed by the Mozilla Project and distributed as a standalone package/jar (packages under org.mozilla.*). Furthermore, Oracle JRE6/7 is bundling an old fork of Rhino (packages under sun.org.mozilla.*).
But those hardening changes were not incorporated into Mozilla's Rhino mainline, which happens once in a while. So the gadget still works if you are using OpenJdk bundled with Ubuntu or Debian.
Let's take a look at the static view of some Rhino core classes:
In the Rhino Javascript domain almost every Javascript language object is represented as a ScriptableObject in the Java domain.
Functions, Types, Regexes and several other Javascript objects are implemented in Java classes, extending ScriptableObject.
A ScriptableObject has two interesting members. A reference to its prototype object and an array of Slot objects. The slots store the properties of a Javascript object. The Slot can either be Slot, GetterSlot or RelinkedSlot. For our gadget we only focus on the GetterSlot inner class.
Every Slot class has a getValue() method used to retrieve the value of the property. In case of a GetterSlot the value is taken from a call to either a MemberBox or Function instance. And both MemberBox and Function instances do dynamic method calls using Java's Reflection API. That's already the essence of the story :-). But let's go into details.
The class NativeError is a successor of IdScriptableObject which inherits from ScriptableObject. ScriptableObject implements the tagging interface Serializable, hence all successors like NativeError are serializable. The class NativeError has an interesting way of how toString() is performed:
In case of a ScriptableObject$GetterSlot (inner class of ScriptableObject) we finally reach the code where reflection calls are eventually happening.
As already shown in the static class view, ScriptableObject$GetterSlot has a member "getter" of class Object. In the getValue() method of ScriptableObject$GetterSlot two cases are checked.
In case of getter being an instance of MemberBox, the invoke method on the MemberBox instance is called which just wraps a dynamic call using Java's Reflection API.
The Method object used in the reflection call comes from the member variable "memberObject" of class MemberBox. Although "memberObject" is of type java.lang.reflect.Member, only java.lang.reflect.Method or java.lang.reflect.Constructor instances are valid classes for "memberObject". Both java.lang.reflect.Method and java.lang.reflect.Constructor are not serializable, so obviously the value of "memberObject" needs to be set in the readObject() method of MemberBox during deserialization.
Specifically, "memberObject" is set in method readMember(), creating a java.lang.reflect.Method object using values coming from the serialized object stream.
So we can control the java.lang.reflect.Method object used in the reflection call. How about the instance ("getterThis") on which method gets invoked? Is this instance also created from the serialized object stream and hence under our control? If we look back into the implementation of method ScriptableObject$GetterSlot.getValue(), we see that the value of "getterThis" depends on the value of member "delegateTo" of the MemberBox instance. "delegateTo" is marked transient and is not set in readObject() during deserialization. So the first case of the if-statement applies and "getterThis" is assigned to "start" which is our NativeError instance. And the arguments of the reflection call are just set to an empty Object[]. Bad for us, but there's hope as we will see later.
Looking again at ScriptableObject$GetterSlot.getValue() we see a second case, if "getter" is an instance of Function. The interface Function sounds very interesting.
And we have plenty of classes implementing Function, most of them being serializable.
From all those classes the serializable NativeJavaMethod class nearly jumped into our face. Before we go into details, let's take another look at the static view of some Rhino core classes, taking the NativeJavaMethod into account.
And a quick look into the call() method revealed the following: In the beginning, the "index" variable is returned from the call to method findCachedFunction(). This method eventually calls findFunction() which calculates one MemberBox instance from the member "methods"(of type MemberBox[]) using a more or less complex algorithm. If the methods array has only one element, findCachedFunction() will just return 0 as the index value.
How about the target instance "javaObject". Can we control it?
We might be able to control it if "o" is an instance of Wrapper. Then, the unwrap() method on "o" is called and the return value assigned to "javaObject". "o" is assigned to "thisObject" which is our NativeError instance. NativeError is not of type Wrapper, but we can see a "for" loop which reassigns "o" to the prototype object of "o" using the getPrototype() method.
So if you can set the prototypeObject member of our NativeError instance to a Wrapper instance and get the unwrap() method to return an object under our control we are ready to go!
And the serializable class NativeJavaObject does what is needed here. It just returns the value of the member "javaObject" in its unwrap() method.
So apperently the only thing we need to do is to create a NativeError instance, set its prototype to a NativeJavaObject which wraps our target instance, create a NativeJavaMethod and specify the method to be invoked on the target instance, serialize it and deserialize it again. But now we get the following exception:
Looks like we need a Context being associated with the current thread :-(
But hey! There is a static method Context.enter() which sets the Context we really need. We just need to trigger it in advance. But how to call Context.enter() if we can't use a MethodBox nor a NativeJavaMethod. To get around this, we use a trick we had known for a while:
When you do a reflection call, the target object is ignored, if the method to be invoked is a static method. That's it.
And if you look back, we already had found a call to invoke() on a MemberBox instance being triggered from method ScriptableObject$GetterSlot.getValue(). But the first argument was always our NativeError instance. As already mentioned, the first argument gets ignored if you use a static method such as Context.enter() as your target method :-).
So if we would have two property accesses on NativeError, we could then trigger a reflection call on Context.enter() using a MemberBox and then another reflection call using a NativeJavaMethod.
Luckily, we have two property accesses in method js_toString() of class NativeError:
The only remaining problem is how to trigger a toString() call on a NativeError object during deserialization. As you may have already seen in our Infiltrate '16 or RuhrSec '16 slidedecks you can use the "trampoline" class javax.management.BadAttributeValueExpException for that.
Getting code execution is trivial now. You can use Adam Gowdiak's technique and create a serializable com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl instance and invoke the newTransformer() method on it by using the reflection primitive of NativeJavaMethod. Or you just invoke the execute() method on a serializable com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl instance and load a RMI class from your server (for further details see our Infiltrate '16 or RuhrSec '16 slidedecks).
