January 18, 2018

Handcrafted Gadgets

Introduction

In Q4 2017 I was pentesting a customer. Shortly before, I had studied json attacks when I stumbled over an internet-facing B2B-portal-type-of-product written in Java they were using (I cannot disclose more details due to responsible disclosure). After a while, I found that one of the server responses sent a serialized Java object, so I downloaded the source code and found a way to make the server deserialize untrusted input. Unfortunately, there was no appropriate gadget available. However, they are using groovy-2.4.5 so when I saw [1] end of december on twitter, I knew I could pwn the target if I succeeded to write a gadget for groovy-2.4.5. This led to this blog post which is based on work by Sam Thomas [2], Wouter Coekaerts [3] and Alvaro Muñoz (pwntester) [4].

Be careful when you fix your readObject() implementation...

We'll start by exploring a popular mistake some developers made during the first mitigation attempts, after the first custom gadgets surfaced after the initial discovery of a vulnerability. Let's check out an example, the Jdk7u21 gadget. A brief recap of what it does: It makes use of a hashcode collision that occurs when a specially crafted instance of java.util.LinkedHashSet is deserialized (you need a string with hashcode 0 for this). It uses a java.lang.reflect.Proxy to create a proxied instance of the interface javax.xml.transform.Templates, with sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandler as InvocationHandler. Ultimately, in an attempt to determine equality of the provided 2 objects the invocation handler calls all argument-less methods of the provided TemplatesImpl class which yields code execution through the malicious byte code inside the TemplatesImpl instance. For further details, check out what the methods AnnotationInvocationHandler.equalsImpl() and TemplatesImpl.newTransletInstance() do (and check out the links related to this gadget).
The following diagram, taken from [5], depicts a graphical overview of the architecture of the gadget.

So far, so well known.
In recent Java runtimes, there are in total 3 fixes inside AnnotationInvocationHandler which break this gadget (see epilogue). But let's start with the first and most obvious bug. The code below is from AnnotationInvocationHandler in Java version 1.7.0_21:

There is a try/catch around an attempt to get the proxied annotation type. But the proxied interface javax.xml.transform.Templates is not an annotation. This constitutes a clear case of potentially dangerous input that would need to be dealt with. However, instead of throwing an exception there is only a return statement inside the catch-branch. Fortunately for the attacker, the instance of the class is already fit for purpose and does not need the rest of the readObject() method in order to be able to do its malicious work. So the "return" is problematic and would have to be replaced by a throw new Exception of some sort.
Let's check how this method looks like in Java runtime 1.7.0_80:

Ok, so problem fixed? Well, yes and no. On the one hand, the use of the exception in the catch-clause will break the gadget which currently ships with ysoserial. On the other hand, this fix is a perfect example of the popular mistake I'm talking about. Wouter Coekaerts (see [3]) came up with an idea how to bypass such "fixes" and Alvaro Muñoz (see [4]) provided a gadget for JRE8u20 which utilizes this technique (in case you're wondering why there is no gadget for jdk1.7.0_80: 2 out of the total 3 fixes mentioned above are already incorporated into this version of the class. Even though it is possible to bypass fix number one, fix number two would definitely stop the attack).
Let's check out how this bypass works in detail.

A little theory

Let's recap what the Java (De-)Serialization does and what the readObject() method is good for. Let's take the example of java.util.HashMap. An instance of it contains data (key/value pairs) and structural information (something derived from the data) that allows logarithmic access times to your data. When serializing an instance of java.util.HashMap it would not be wise to fully serialize its internal representation. Instead it is completely sufficient to only serialize the data that is required to reconstruct its original state: Metadata (loadfactor, size, ...) followed by the key/value pairs as flat list. Let's have a look at the code:

As you can see, the method starts with a call to defaultReadObject. After that, the instance attributes loadFactor and threshold are initialized and can be used. The key/value pairs are located at the end of the serialized stream. Since the key/value pairs are contained as an unstructured flat list in the stream calling putVal(key,value) basically restores the internal structure, what allows to efficiently use them later on.
In general, it is fair to assume that many readObject() methods look like this:

Coming back to AnnotationInvocationHandler, we can see that its method readObject follows this pattern. Since the problem was located in the custom code section of the method, the fix was also applied there. In both versions, ObjectInputStream.defaultReadObject() is the first instruction. Now let's discuss why this is a problem and how the bypass works.

Handcrafted Gadgets

At work we frequently use ysoserial gadgets. I suppose that many readers are probably familiar with the ysoserial payloads and how these are created. A lot of Java reflection, a couple of fancy helper classes doing stuff like setting Fields, creating Proxy and Constructor instances. With "Handcrafted Gadgets" I meant gadgets of a different kind. Gadgets which cannot be created in the fashion ysoserial does (which is: create an instance of a Java object and serialize it). The gadgets I'm talking about are created by compiling a serialization stream manually, token by token. The result is something that can be deserialized but does not represent a legal Java class instance. If you would like to see an example, check out Alvaro's JRE8_20 gadget [4]. But let me not get ahead of myself, let's take a step back and focus on the problem I mentioned at the end of the last paragraph. The problem is that if the developer does not take care when fixing the readObject method, there might be a way to bypass that fix. The JRE8_20 gadget is an example of such a bypass. The original idea was, as already mentioned in the introduction, first described by Wouter Coekaerts [2]. It can be summarized as follows:

Idea

The fundamental insight is the fact that many classes are at least partly functional when the default attributes have been instantiated and propagated by the ObjectInputStream.defaultReadObject() method call. This is the case for AnnotationInvocationHandler (in older Java versions, more recent versions don't call this method anymore). The attacker does not need the readObject to successfully terminate, an object instance where the method ObjectInputStream.defaultReadObject() has executed is perfectly okay. However, it is definitely not okay from an attacker's perspective if readObject throws an exception, since, eventually this will break deserialization of the gadget completely. The second very important detail is the fact that if it is possible to suppress somehow the InvalidObjectException (to stick with the AnnotationInvocationHandler example) then it is possible to access the instance of AnnotationInvocationHandler later through references. During the deserialization process ObjectInputStream keeps a cache of various sorts of objects. When AnnotationInvocationHandler.readObject is called an instance of the object is available in that cache.
This brings the number of necessary steps to write the gadget down to two. Firstly, store the AnnotationInvocationHandler in the cache by somehow wrapping it such that the exception is suppressed. Secondly, build the original gadget, but replace the AnnotationInvocationHandler in it by a reference to the object located in the cache.

Now let's step through the detailed technical explanation.
  1. References
  2. The wrapper class: BeanContextSupport
  3. The cache

References

If one thinks about object serialization and the fact that you can nest objects recursively it is clear that something like references must exist. Think about the following construct:
Here, the attribute a of class instance c points to an existing instance already serialized before and the serialized stream must reflect this somehow. When you look at a serialized binary stream you can immediately see the references: The hex representation usually looks like this:
71 00 7E AB CD
where AB CD is a short value which represents the array index of the referenced object in the cache. You can easily spot references in the byte stream since hex 71 is "q" and hex 7E is "~":


The wrapper class: BeanContextSupport

Wouter Coekaerts found the class java.beans.beancontext.BeanContextSupport. At some point during deserialization it does the following:
continue in the catch-branch, exactly what we need. So if we can build a serialized stream with an AnnotationInvocationHandler as first child of an instance of BeanContextSupport during deserialization we will end up in the catch (IOException ioe) branch and deserialization will continue.
Let's test this out. I will build a serialized stream with an illegal AnnotationInvocationHandler in it ("illegal" means that the type attribute is not an annotation) and we will see that the stream deserializes properly without throwing an exception. Here is what the structure of this stream will look like:
Once done, the deserialized object is a HashMap with one key/value pair, key is an instance of BeanContextSupport, value is "whatever".
Click here to see the code on github.com
You need to build Alvaro's project [6] to get the jar file necessary for building this:
kai@CodeVM:~/eworkspace/deser$ javac -cp /home/kai/JRE8u20_RCE_Gadget/target/JRE8Exploit-1.0-SNAPSHOT.jar BCSSerializationTest.java
kai@CodeVM:~/eworkspace/deser$ java -cp .:/home/kai/JRE8u20_RCE_Gadget/target/JRE8Exploit-1.0-SNAPSHOT.jar BCSSerializationTest > 4blogpost
Writing java.lang.Class at offset 1048
Done writing java.lang.Class at offset 1094
Writing java.util.HashMap at offset 1094
Done writing java.util.HashMap at offset 1172
Adjusting reference from: 6 to: 8
Adjusting reference from: 6 to: 8
Adjusting reference from: 8 to: 10
Adjusting reference from: 9 to: 11
Adjusting reference from: 6 to: 8
Adjusting reference from: 14 to: 16
Adjusting reference from: 14 to: 16
Adjusting reference from: 14 to: 16
Adjusting reference from: 14 to: 16
Adjusting reference from: 17 to: 19
Adjusting reference from: 17 to: 19
kai@CodeVM:~/eworkspace/deser$

A little program that deserializes the created file and prints out the resulting object shows us this:
kai@CodeVM:~/eworkspace/deser$ java -cp ./bin de.cw.deser.Main deserialize 4blogpost
{java.beans.beancontext.BeanContextSupport@723279cf=whatever}

This concludes the first part, we successfully wrapped an instance of AnnotationInvocationHandler inside another class such that deserialization completes successfully.

The cache

Now we need to make that instance accessible. First we need to get hold of the cache. In order to do this, we need to debug. We set a breakpoint at the highlighted line in java.util.HashMap:
Then start the deserializer program and step into readObject:


When we open it we can see that number 24 is what we were looking for.


Here is one more interesting thing: If you deserialize with an older patch level of the Java Runtime, the object is initialized as can be seen in the sceenshot below:


If you use a more recent patch level like Java 1.7.0_151 you will see that the attributes memberValues and type are null. This is the effect of the third improvement in the class I've been talking about before. More recent versions don't call defaultReadObject at all, anymore. Instead, they first check if type is an annotation type and only after that they populate the default fields.
Let's do one more little exercise. In the program above in line 150, change

        TC_STRING,
        "whatever",

to
        TC_REFERENCE,
        baseWireHandle + 24,

and run the program again:
kai@CodeVM:~/eworkspace/deser$ java -cp ./bin de.cw.deser.Main deserialize 4blogpost2
{java.beans.beancontext.BeanContextSupport@723279cf=sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandler@10f87f48}

As you can see, the entry in the handles table can easily be referenced.
Now we'll leave the Jdk7u21 gadget and AnnotationInvocationHandler and build a gadget for groovy 2.4.5 using the techniques outlined above.

A deserialization gadget for groovy-2.4.5

Based on an idea of Sam Thomas (see [2]).
The original gadget for version 2.3.9 looks like this:
Trigger is readObject of our beloved AnnotationInvocationHandler, it will call entrySet of the memberValues hash map, which is a proxy class with invocation handler of type org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.ConvertedClosure. Now every invocation of ConvertedClosure will be delegated to doCall of the nested instance of MethodClosure which is a wrapper of the call to the groovy function execute. The OS command that will be executed is provided as member attribute to MethodClosure.
After the original gadget for version 2.3.9 showed up MethodClosure was fixed by adding a method readResolve to the class org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.MethodClosure:
If the global constant ALLOW_RESOLVE is not set to true an UnsupportedOperationException is supposed to break the deserialization. Basically, this means that an instance of MethodClosure cannot be deserialized anymore unless one explicitely enables it. Let's quickly analyze MethodClosure: The class does not have a readObject method and readResolve is called after the default built-in deserialization. So when readResolve throws the exception the situation is almost identical to the one explained in the above paragraphs: An instance of MethodClosure is already in the handle table. But there is one important difference: AnnotationInvocationHandler throws an InvalidObjectException which is a child of IOException whereas readResolve throws an UnsupportedOperationException, which is a child of RuntimeException. BeanContextSupport, however, only catches IOException and ClassCastException. So the identical approach as outlined above would not work: The exception would not be caught. Fortunately, in late 2016 Sam Thomas found the class sun.security.krb5.KRBError which in its readObject method transforms every type of exception into IOException:
This means if we put KRBError in between BeanContextSupport and MethodClosure the UnsupportedOperationException will be translated into IOException which is ultimately caught inside the readChildren method of BeanContextSupport. So our wrapper construct looks like this:
Some readers might be confused by the fact that you can nest an object of type MethodClosure inside a KRBError. Looking at the code and interface of the latter, there is no indication that this is possible. But it is important to keep in mind that what we are concerned with here are not Java objects! We are dealing with a byte stream that is deserialized. If you look again at the readObject method of KRBError you can see that this class calls ObjectInputStream.readObject() right away. So here, every serialized Java object will do fine. Only the cast to byte array will throw a ClassCastException, but remember: An exception will be thrown already before that and this is perfectly fine with the design of our exploit.
Now it is time to put the pieces together. The complete exploit consists of a hash map with one key/value pair, the BeanContextSupport is the key, the groovy gadget is the value. [1] suggests putting the BeanContextSupport inside the AnnotationInvocationHandler but it has certain advantages for debugging to use the hash map. Final structure looks like this:
The final exploit can be found on github.com.

Epilogue

I had mentioned 3 improvements in AnnotationInvocationHandler but I only provided one code snippet. For the sake of completeness, here are the two:
The second fix in jdk1.7.0_80 which already breaks the jdk gadget is a check in equalsImpl:
The highlighted check will filter out the methods getOutputProperties and newTransformer of TemplatesImpl because they are not considered annotation methods, and getMemberMethods returns an empty array so the methods of TemplatesImpl are never called and nothing happens. The third fix which you can find for example in version 1.7.0_151 finally fixes readObject:
As one can see, only the 2 last calls actually set the member attributes type and memberValues. defeaultReadObject is not used at all. Before, the type check for the annotation class is performed. If it fails, an InvalidObjectException is thrown and type and memberValues remain null.

References

  1. https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2017/12/19/apache-groovy-deserialization-a-cunning-exploit-chain-to-bypass-a-patch
  2. http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-17-044/
  3. http://wouter.coekaerts.be/2015/annotationinvocationhandler
  4. https://github.com/pwntester/JRE8u20_RCE_Gadget/blob/master/src/main/java/ExploitGenerator.java
  5. https://gist.github.com/frohoff/24af7913611f8406eaf3
  6. https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial/blob/master/src/main/java/ysoserial/payloads/Groovy1.java

May 17, 2017

SAP Customers: Make sure your SAPJVM is up to date!

Summary

Code White have already an impressive publication record on Java Deserialization. This post is dedicated to a vulnerability in SAP NetWeaver Java. We could reach remote code execution through the p4 protocol and the Jdk7u21 gadget with certain engines and certain versions of the SAP JVM.

We would like to emphasize the big threat unauthenticated RCE poses to a SAP NetWeaver Java. An attacker with a remote shell can read out the secure storage, access the database, create a local NetWeaver user with administrative privileges, in other words, fully compromise the host. Unfortunately, this list is far from being complete. An SAP landscape is usually a network of tightly
connected servers and services. It wouldn’t be unusual that the database of the server stores technical users with high privileges for other SAP systems, be it NetWeaver ABAP or others. Once the attacker gets hold of credentials for those users she can extend her foothold in the organization and eventually compromise the entire SAP landscape.

We tested our exploit successfully on 7.20, 7.30 and 7.40 machines, for detailed version numbers see below. When contacted, SAP Product Security Response told us they published 3 notes (see [7], [8] and [9]) about updates fixing the problems (already in June 2013) with SAP JVM versions 1.5.0_086, 1.6.0_052 and 1.7.0_009 (we tested on earlier versions, see below). In addition SAP have recently adopted JDK JEP 290 (a Java enhancement that allows to filter incoming serialized data). However, neither do these three notes mention Java Deserialization nor is it obvious to the reader they relate to security in any other way.

Due to missing access to the SAP Service Marketplace we’re unable to make any statement about the aforementioned SAP JVM versions. We could only analyze the latest available SAP JVM from tools.hana.ondemand.com (see [6]) which contained a fix for the problem.

Details

In his RuhrSec Infiltrate 2016 talk, Code White’s former employee Matthias Kaiser already talked about SAP NetWeaver Java being vulnerable [2]. The work described here is completely independent of his research.
The natural entry point in this area is the p4 protocol. We found a p4 test client on SAP Collaboration Network and sniffed the traffic. One doesn’t need to wait long until a serialized object is sent over the wire:

00000000  76 31                                            v1
00000002  18 23 70 23 34 4e 6f 6e  65 3a 31 32 37 2e 30 2e .#p#4Non e:127.0.
00000012  31 2e 31 3a 35 39 32 35  36                      1.1:5925 6

    00000000  76 31 19 23 70 23 34 4e  6f 6e 65 3a 31 30 2e 30 v1.#p#4N one:10.0
    00000010  2e 31 2e 31 38 34 3a 35  30 30 30 34             .1.184:5 0004

0000001B  00 00 11 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 ff ff ff ff 00 00 ........ ........
0000002B  00 00 00 00 00 00 0a 00  63 00 6f 00 63 00 72    ........ c.o.c.r

    0000001C  00 00 75 00 00 00 ff ff  ff ff 9e 06 60 00 00 00 ..u..... ....`...
    0000002C  00 00 00 00 00 00 0b 9e  06 60 00 f7 25 e4 05 00 ........ .`..%...
    0000003C  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 98  9c 0e 2a 00 4e 00 6f 00 ........ ..*.N.o.
    0000004C  6e 00 65 00 3a 00 31 00  30 00 2e 00 31 00 30 00 n.e.:.1. 0...1.0.
    0000005C  2e 00 31 00 30 00 2e 00  31 00 30 00 3a 00 35 00 ..1.0... 1.0.:.5.
    0000006C  30 00 30 00 30 00 34 00  3a 00 4e 00 6f 00 6e 00 0.0.0.4. :.N.o.n.
    0000007C  65 00 3a 00 31 00 30 00  2e 00 30 00 2e 00 31 00 e.:.1.0. ..0...1.
    0000008C  2e 00 31 00 38 00 34 00  3a 00 35 00 30 00 30 00 ..1.8.4. :.5.0.0.
    0000009C  30 00 34                                         0.4

0000003A  00 00 16 00 00 00 9e 06  60 00 ff ff ff ff fe 00 ........ `.......
0000004A  00 00 00 00 00 00 14 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........ ........
0000005A  98 9c 0e 2a                                      ...*
0000005E  00 00 75 00 00 00 9e 06  60 00 ff ff ff ff 01 00 ..u..... `.......
0000006E  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 20 00 00 67 ........ .... ..g
0000007E  00 65 00 74 00 43 00 6c  00 61 00 73 00 73 00 42 .e.t.C.l .a.s.s.B
0000008E  00 79 00 4e 00 61 00 6d  00 65 00 28 00 6a 00 61 .y.N.a.m .e.(.j.a
0000009E  00 76 00 61 00 2e 00 6c  00 61 00 6e 00 67 00 2e .v.a...l .a.n.g..
000000AE  00 53 00 74 00 72 00 69  00 6e 00 67 00 29 00 00 .S.t.r.i .n.g.)..
000000BE  00 00 00 00 00 00 98 9c  0e 2a ac ed 00 05 74 00 ........ .*....t.
000000CE  12 43 6c 69 65 6e 74 49  44 50 72 6f 70 61 67 61 .ClientI DPropaga
000000DE  74 6f 72                                         tor
  


The highlighted part is just the java.lang.String object “ClientIDPropagator”.

Now our plan was to replace this serialized object by a ysoserial payload. Therefore, we needed to find out how the length of such a message block is encoded.

When we look at offset 0000005E, for instance, the 00 00 75 00 looks like 2 header null bytes and then a length in little endian format. Hex 75 is 117, but the total length of the last block is 8*16+3 = 131. If one looks at the blocks the client sent before (at offset 0000001B and 0000003A) one can easily spot that the real length of the block is always 14 more than what is actually sent. This lead to the first conclusion: a message block consists of 2 null bytes, 2 bytes length of the payload in little endian format, then 10 bytes of some (not understood) header information, then the payload:

When running the test client several times and by spotting the messages carefully enough one can see that the payload and header aren’t static: They use 2 4-bytes words sent in the second reply from
the server:


That was enough to set up a first small python program: Send the corresponding byte arrays in the right order, read the replies from the network, set the 4 byte words accordingly and replace “ClientIDPropagator” by the ysoserial Jdk7u21 gadget.

Unfortunately, this didn’t work out at first. A bit later we realized that SAP NetWeaver Java obviously didn’t serialize with the plain vanilla Java ObjectOutputStream but with a custom serializer. After twisting and tweaking a bit we were finally successful. Details are left to the reader ;-)

To demonstrate how dangerous this is we have published a disarmed exploit on github [5]. Instead of using a payload that writes a simple file to the current directory (e.g. cw98653.txt with contents "VULNERABLE"), like we did, an attacker can also add bytecode that runs Runtime.getRuntime().exec("rm -rf *") or establish a remote shell on the system and thereby compromise the system or in the worst case even parts of the SAP landscape.

We could successfully verify this exploit on the following systems:
  •  SAP Application Server Java 7.20 with SAPJVM 1.6.0_07 (build 007)
  •  SAP Application Server Java 7.30 with SAPJVM 1.6.0_23 (build 034)
  •  SAP Application Server Java 7.40 with SAPJVM 1.6.0_43 (build 048)
After SAP Product Security’s response, we downloaded SAPJVM 1.6.0_141 build 99 from [6] and indeed, the AnnotationInvocationHandler, which is at the core of theJdk7u21 gadget exploits, was patched. So, with that version, the JdkGadget cannot be used anymore for exploitation.

However, since staying up-to-date with modern software product release cycles is a big challenge for customers and the corresponding SAP notes do not explicitely bring the reader’s attention to a severe security vulnerability, we’d like to raise awareness that not updating the SAP JVM can expose their SAP systems to serious threats.

Mitigation

  •  Block p4 on your firewall
  •  Make sure your SAP JVM is up-to-date

References

  1. https://foxglovesecurity.com/2015/11/06/what-do-weblogic-websphere-jboss-jenkinsopennms-
    and-your-application-have-in-common-this-vulnerability/
  2. http://codewhitesec.blogspot.de/2016/04/infiltrate16-slidedeck-java-deserialization.html
  3. https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial
  4. https://cal.sap.com/
  5. https://github.com/codewhitesec/sap-p4-java-deserialization-exploit
  6. https://tools.hana.ondemand.com/additional/sapjvm-6.1.099-linux-x64.zip
  7. SAP Note 1875035 (available to customers since June, 2013) for SAP JVM 5
  8. SAP Note 1875026 (available to customers since June, 2013) for SAP JVM 6
  9. SAP Note 1875042 (available to customers since June, 2013) for SAP JVM 7
  10. SAP note 2443673 from April 2017

April 4, 2017

AMF – Another Malicious Format

AMF is a binary serialization format primarily used by Flash applications. Code White has found that several Java AMF libraries contain vulnerabilities, which result in unauthenticated remote code execution. As AMF is widely used, these vulnerabilities may affect products of numerous vendors, including Adobe, Atlassian, HPE, SonicWall, and VMware.

Vulnerability disclosure has been coordinated with US CERT (see US CERT VU#307983).

May 4, 2016

Return of the Rhino: An old gadget revisited

[Update 08/05/2015: Added reference to CVE-2012-3213 of James Forshaw. Thanks for the heads up]

As already mentioned in our Infiltrate '16 and RuhrSec '16 talks, Code White spent some research time to look for serialization gadgets. Apart from the Javassist/Weld gadget we also found an old but interesting gadget, only using classes from the Java Runtime Environment (so called JRE gadget).

We called the gadget Return of the Rhino since the relevant gadget classes are part of the Javascript engine Rhino, bundled with Oracle JRE6 and JRE7.
As you may already know, the Rhino Script engine has already been abused in JVM sandbox escapes in the past (e.g. CVE-2011-3544 of Michael Schierl and CVE-2012-3213 of James Forshaw).

April 12, 2016

Infiltrate 2016 Slidedeck: Java Deserialization Vulnerabilities

The outcome of Code White's research efforts into Java deserialization vulnerabilities was presented at Infiltrate 2016 by Matthias Kaiser.

The talk gave an introduction into finding and exploiting Java deserialization vulnerabilities. Technical details about the Oracle Weblogic deserialization RCE (CVE-2015-4852) and a SAP Netweaver AS Java 0day were shown.

The slidedeck doesn't include the SAP Netweaver AS Java 0day POC and it won't be published until fixed.

It  can be found here:
http://www.slideshare.net/codewhitesec/java-deserialization-vulnerabilities-the-forgotten-bug-class

Stay tuned!